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Bonapartism in Algeria: 
Empire and Sovereignty Before the Third Republic 
 
Gavin Murray-Miller* 
 
Abstract 
Between 1852 and 1870, Napoleon III and his Bonapartist entourage successfully established a 
Second Napoleonic Empire that encouraged a “cult of the emperor” emphasizing the strong and 
even mystical bond between the sovereign and the people. While the “spectacular politics” of the 
Bonapartist regime have been examined in detail, far less attention has been given to how 
Bonapartist patriotism was applied within a colonial context and, more specifically, in relation to 
Algeria. This article examines iterations of Bonapartist dynastic patriotism and nationalist 
politics in North Africa. It argues that an evaluation of French imperial sovereignty and practices 
in the years prior to the Third Republic can help diversify our understanding of the French 
colonial experience and propose models that diverged from the narrative of republican 
colonialism in crucial ways during the post-revolutionary period. 
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I. 
At 5:30 A.M. on the morning of 3 May 1865 the sound of cannon fire was heard echoing along 
the coastal ports of Algiers. The thunderous shots signaled the appearance of the imperial yacht 
coming into port and an hour later Napoleon III stepped foot on Algerian soil for the first time in 
five years to cries of “Vive l’Empereur!”1 To commemorate the Emperor’s visit to the colony, 
public celebrations abounded during the days with regal displays of French military prowess 
staged by the army and Muslim subjects entertaining guests with horseback riding 
demonstrations. In the evenings, the public buildings and mosques of the capital were 
illuminated with dazzling pale light. “It really was an enchanted spectacle,” the newly appointed 
governor-general Patrice de Mac-Mahon admitted when reflecting on the events.2  
Napoleon III was the first head of state to visit the Algerian colony acquired by France in 
1830. His two state visits during the 1860s signaled Algeria’s growing importance in both 
France’s expanding colonial empire and sense of national prestige. For colonists, the emperor’s 
visits were hailed as momentous events. The presence of the emperor not only symbolized 
Algeria’s importance to the mother country; it also offered colonists an opportunity to make 
known their aspirations for assimilation and civil equality with their compatriots across the 
Mediterranean.3 Above all, however, the occasion offered colonists a moment to demonstrate 
their patriotism to the emperor in person, affirming that they were a single French people united 
in their love and devotion to a common sovereign. Describing the fanfare that accompanied the 
emperor’s arrival, the journalist Joseph Guérin vividly captured the mood of the occasion, 
reporting: “the crowd was only a single soul and it emerges in the cry repeated a thousand times 
over of Vive l’Empereur!”4 
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Yet the pomp and festivities staged to welcome the emperor concealed an underlying 
anxiety which had been brewing in the colony since his previous visit in 1860. During the 
interval, Napoleon III had announced his latest Algerian policy, dictating to the consternation of 
many colonists and high-ranking military officials that Algeria was to be considered an “Arab 
Kingdom” rather than a French colony “strictly speaking.” The tone of his speeches while 
touring the colony reflected this new outlook, evincing a noticeable concern with Algeria’s vast 
Muslim majority and a commitment to regenerating an indigenous Arab nationality. “When 
France placed its foot on African soil thirty-five years ago,” he declared before an audience of 
Muslim, Jewish and European subjects assembled in Algiers, “it did not come to destroy the 
nationality of a people but, on the contrary, to lift this people from an old oppression.”5 Such 
pronouncements were a far cry from the emperor’s bold statement in 1852 pledging that “across 
from Marseille we have a vast territory to assimilate to France.”6 
These apparent incongruities say much about the Bonapartist movement in France. 
Originating with Napoleon I and persisting under subsequent regimes during the post-
revolutionary period, Bonapartism, as a political movement and ideology, has often been 
characterized by a “permanent ambiguity.”7 The political eclecticism encouraged by leading 
Bonapartist ideologues and the absence of any definitive Bonapartist party in the country have 
made pinning down the core ideological tenets associated with Bonapartism exceedingly 
difficult. John Rothney once spoke of an “entire Bonapartist spectrum” extending from the 
extreme right to the radical left while other historians such as Sudhir Hazareesingh have noted 
the “remarkably plastic and synthetic qualities” which made Louis Napoleon Bonaparte 
(Napoleon III), nephew of the former emperor, appealing to a wide range of public opinion at 
mid-century.8 To some degree, the elusive nature of Bonapartism stems from its eclectic 
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character, which permitted the Second Napoleonic Empire created in 1852 to draw upon 
traditional monarchial and imperial discourses while equally promoting democratic and 
nationalist policies. Without doubt, the seeming contradictions of the Second Empire were many: 
it reached out to liberals and conservatives, urban workers and the rural peasantry alike; it 
promoted the industrial sciences and nationalism while simultaneously cultivating relations with 
Catholic leaders and religious notables; it presented itself as a populist government while 
maintaining a regal court culture.9 Given these contradictions, it is easy to see how Bonapartism 
may appear opportunistic or incoherent. Yet to claim so would misconstrue one of the 
fundamental premises that underpinned what Louis Napoleon Bonaparte once called the 
“Napoleonic Idea.” 
At base, Bonapartism rested upon a specific idea of the sovereign, one that sacralized the 
relationship between emperor and subject. Its ability to identify with different social and 
ideological groups was one of its hallmark features, presenting a political model that ran counter 
to Rousseauist ideas of republican unity promoted during the French Revolution. Although 
conventional narratives present the modern “nation form” sweeping away older arrangements 
vested in confessional, local or dynastic identification, in reality imperial and dynastic models 
continued to predominate over communitarian ideas of nationhood or isonomic republican 
principles in the post-revolutionary period.10 The First Napoleonic Empire showed itself willing 
to promote a brand of “cosmopolitanism” in Egypt and Europe consistent with multiethnic 
empires  like those governed by the Habsburgs and Ottomans. Different ethnic and confessional 
groups were, to varying degrees, tolerated and administered through distinct state institutions 
contrary to republican notions of civic uniformity.11 Throughout the nineteenth century imperial 
and monarchial forms persisted in tandem with nationalizing tendencies, and French 
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Bonapartism was no difference in this respect. It oriented itself toward a polity and style of rule 
which Daniel Unowky has identified as state or “dynastic patriotism.”12 At its center stood the 
sovereign reimagined as a veritable icon embodying all the attachment to people and country that 
the term “patriotism” evoked.  
The festivities, political speeches and cries of Vive l’Empereur! that accompanied the 
imperial visits to Algeria during the 1860s revealed this “dynastic patriotism” in action. That 
said, scholars have rarely considered the implication of Algeria when considering Bonapartism. 
The vast amount of scholarship on the Second Empire has privileged a metropolitan framework, 
resulting in an incomplete picture of imperial politics and sensibilities. Post-revolutionary French 
imperialism has only recently begun to receive more thorough attention from historians.13 David 
Todd’s acknowledgment of a “French imperial meridian” has proposed a framework in which to 
consider how regimes prior to the Third Republic imagined the modern colonial empire and 
contributed to the making of a national colonial culture.14 Examining Bonapartism in its Algerian 
iteration furnishes a context in which to evaluate key themes of imperial sovereignty and 
dynastic patriotism that played a central role in this process. It also revises older interpretations 
of Bonapartist “authoritarianism” which have identified a Bonapartist movement through its 
right-wing, overtly nationalist and anti-democratic elements.15 In this view, it would be easy to 
draw a straight line between Bonapartism and the authoritarian, racist settler nationalism that 
developed in Algeria in later years. This continuity between an authoritarian politic and what 
Samuel Kalman has called “colonial fascism” should, however, be questioned.16 The blending of 
dynastic and national ideas that constituted Bonapartist conceptions of sovereignty may have 
focused attention on a cult of the leader, but its basic principles rejected the forms of xenophobia 
and racialized nationalism that characterized the radical French right later in the century. At its 
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core, Bonapartism provided a framework adaptable to ruling over a multiethnic empire that 
mixed ideas of revolutionary nationalism and dynastic loyalty in equal measure.     
During the 1860s, Algerian officials and colonists showed a willingness to adopt the 
Bonapartist script. Publicists and colonial interest groups relied heavily upon prevailing 
discourses of Bonapartist democracy in framing requests for state patronage and representative 
institutions through the decade. Local officials organized and shared in the celebrations of 
national-imperial sovereignty staged during the state visits, repeatedly emphasizing Algeria’s 
special relationship with France through Napoleonic symbols and mass expressions of dynastic 
loyalty. In making appeals to Algeria’s native population, ceremonies readily evoked memories 
of the Napoleonic Egyptian expedition. Aspirations of “regenerating” a decadent Orient and 
attempts to paint Napoleon III as an “Arab” emperor consciously harkened back to Napoleon I’s 
earlier efforts at “playing Muslim,” inscribing the process of Algerian colonization within the 
context of a veritable Bonapartist tradition.17  
These manifestations of Bonapartist political culture not only provided a conceptual 
space for the representation of Algeria within public life; they also hinted at an alternative vision 
of colonial empire distinct from republican ideas vested in citizenship and assimilation. French 
colonial studies have often highlighted struggles over political rights and the inability to square a 
secular, universalist ideology with the realities of imperial diversity. In this regard, historians 
have drawn attention to the inequalities and exclusionary practices that routinely pitted a white 
European settler community invested with rights against a disenfranchised colonized population. 
While these inequalities should not be ignored or trivialized, they are part of a larger narrative 
that has sought to explain, whether explicitly or implicitly, the shortcomings of the republican 
civilizing mission and the many contradictions it engendered.18 This conclusion was, however, 
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never pre-determined. Prior to the founding of the Third Republic, republican discourses vied 
with competing ideologies and nation-building programs during the post-revolutionary period. 
Debates over rights and citizenship existed alongside rival iterations of sovereignty, entailing 
that republican colonialism was only one among various imperial imaginaries in the nineteenth 
century.19 Bonapartism proposed a system capable of governing a multiethnic state and held out 
the possibility of an imperial polity that blended democratic practices with dynastic authority. 
Only after 1870 did republican isonomy and assimilation became the predominant elements of a 
colonial state and culture that has since assumed primacy in our understanding of the French 
imperial experience.  
Taking the idea of a “French imperial meridian” seriously entails looking beyond the 
discourses of French republicanism and accounting for the divergent articulations of imperial 
sovereignty that shaped the evolution and practices of empire in France. An assessment of 
Bonapartist political culture in Algeria permits us to reconstruct an alternative vision of empire 
that paralleled nineteenth-century republican colonialism, contextualizing the demands for rights 
and inclusion that routinely burdened the république coloniale over the course of its existence. 
 
II. 
With the establishment of universal manhood suffrage in 1848, French politics assumed an 
imminently popular and democratic character in spirit if not in practice. The Bonapartists of the 
mid-nineteenth century understood this new political culture perfectly. They adeptly employed 
symbols and mass spectacles to create and sustain a Second Napoleonic Empire that was 
ostensibly progressive in sprit while authoritarian in character.20 Through a series of national 
referendums, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte legitimated his illegal coup d’état in 1851 and founded 
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his imperial government a year later with popular support. He was hardly being flippant when he 
appeared before the assembly in the spring of 1852 and remarked “the head of state you have 
before you is the expression of the popular will.”21 In the terms of Bonapartist democracy, the 
people had empowered the government through a single vote, “clear, simple, and understood by 
all,” rendering the new Napoleon a manifestation of the general will.22 As one propagandist put 
the matter bluntly: “Bonapartism is now what it has always professed to be, the legitimate 
representative of national sovereignty.”23 
Studies on Bonapartism and the Second Empire have frequently stressed the national 
tenor of imperial politics, especially in relation to the specific conception of national sovereignty 
that underwrote the idea and practice of Bonapartist democracy.24 The Bonapartist revival was a 
product of the nationalist resurgence that grew up during the 1840s and consciously presented 
itself as a popular movement with deep roots in the French national soil.25 “Before [the Empire] 
rallied all the forces of the nation, it was born in the cottages of the people,” proclaimed the 
inveterate Bonapartist, the Duc de Persigny.26 This rhetoric extended, however, beyond simple 
veneration for the French nation and people. From its origins in the late-eighteenth century, 
Bonapartism had persistently emphasized the strong and even “sacred” link that united sovereign 
and people. This pact was a consistent centerpiece of Bonapartist political discourse throughout 
much of the century.27 It rested upon the belief that the emperor, empowered through national 
referendums, faithfully represented the sentiments and will of the nation. It was this peculiar mix 
of Rousseauist volunteerism and executive autonomy that gave Bonapartism its distinct character 
and ideological import.28  
Efforts to objectify this sacred bond encouraged public spectacles featuring the emperor 
and the imperial family. Over the 1850s and 1860s, Napoleon III appeared regularly at ribbon-
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cutting ceremonies and national exhibitions throughout the country. Even when absent, the 
sovereign was evoked in speeches or represented on ceremonial medals and prizes distributed at 
events. Statesmen used recourse to old Napoleonic memories to impart an imminently national 
character to the Second Empire and instructed officials to appeal to “the Napoleonic sentiment of 
the people” at every opportunity.29 Public festivities regularly featured imperial eagles and large 
letter Ns adorning buildings while Napoleon I’s birthday was made an official fête nationale in 
the hope of replacing the collective memory of the Revolution with that of the First Empire and 
Bonaparte family.30 Focusing attention on the Napoleonic cult, Bonapartist ideologues 
endeavored to present the family as a national dynasty, one capable of attracting support from 
monarchists who had never accepted the nation’s republican heritage. They were careful to avoid 
the conservative and aristocratic royalism of the former Bourbon line, distinguishing the 
Bonapartes as a popular dynasty endowed with the necessary esprit national and patriotism 
capable of uniting the nation.31 “The Napoleonic dynasty, deriving from the ranks of the nation, 
cannot forget that it belongs to everyone,” as one writer stated.32  
These iterations of national sovereignty and dynastic heritage were hardly a clumsy 
attempt to dress royal pretensions in a national garb. By its very nature, Bonapartist politics 
relied upon a distinct style of public spectacle and nationalism centered on the figure of the 
sovereign and his link to the people. It was an affective politic based as much on emotional 
attachment to the leader as on its synthetic ideological content. As late as 1870, the journalist and 
politician Adolphe Granier de Cassagnac testified to the resilience of the Bonaparte cult, 
insisting that the majority of French peasants cared little for day to day politics or debates in the 
Corps législatif. “The rural populations know only the Emperor, want only him and will vote 
only for him.”33 
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Napoleon III’s public persona and presence were important to the success and vitality of 
the new government. Public appearances by the emperor were routinely presented in newspaper 
accounts and imperial travel literature, both of which served as important channels of 
government propaganda. At the inauguration of the Boulevard de Sébastopol in Paris in 1858, 
the pro-imperial newspaper Le Constitutionnel focused attention on the enthusiasm of the crowd, 
insisting, “Nation and Emperor think and act with the same confidence and the same 
sympathy.”34 In an account of the emperor’s tour of the empire in the autumn of 1860, authors 
did not fail to emphasize the “immense crowd” that turned out to greet the imperial family at 
Lyon or the “impatient cries” of those waiting to catch a glimpse of their leader.35 Moving on to 
Avignon, the family received an “enthusiastic welcome” from thousands of spectators while days 
later the imperial palace in Corsica was thronged by a “passionate crowd” expressing their 
devotion to the sovereign.36 Lively descriptions (and inflated statistics) of excited crowds 
clamoring to welcome the emperor were a common trope in newspaper accounts. Vivid 
illustrations frequently accompanied the descriptions that appeared in book form during the 
1850s and 1860s. Whether in word or image, such media was intended to provide readers with a 
virtual experience allowing them to participate vicariously in the ecstasy of the crowd and 
partake in that scared link uniting sovereign and people. More than simply propaganda, 
newspaper accounts and imperial travel literature were part and parcel of the Bonapartist 
political culture elaborated during the mid-nineteenth century.  
In some instances, authors barely disguised their motivations. In his account of the 
emperor’s trip to Algeria in 1865, Réné de Saint-Félix spelled out in no uncertain terms the 
importance he attributed to the official visit. His tome was intended to show that “the love of the 
populations, already so profoundly attached to the Napoleonic dynasty, has been reinforced in 
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seeing this strong monarch.” While modesty may have compelled Saint-Félix to assure his 
readers that his account contained only “sincere and disinterested considerations,” the didactic 
intent of the work was not hard to mistake. In the author’s own words, the book aimed to “teach 
many of our citizens, not only to love the Emperor—the voice of the people has already proven 
the unanimity of their sentiments—but to better understand and comprehend the providential 
man who, retaking the hereditary scepter, has committed himself to leading France along the 
path of justice, glory and prosperity.”37 Saint-Félix’s Napoléon III en Algérie was one of the 
more blatantly Bonapartist pieces of imperial travel literature to appear in the 1860s, but others 
similarly linked themes of public visibility, dynastic patriotism and imperial sovereignty in more 
nuanced ways.  
 Saint-Félix’s account was not, however, complete fabrication. Bonapartist pageantry was 
in full display during the two official trips to Algeria. Upon disembarking from the imperial 
yacht in 1860, the mayor of Algiers greeted the imperial family and presented Napoleon III with 
the key to the city. Before a crowd amassed on the waterfront, he insisted “It is from the depth of 
our heart that, all together, soldiers and citizens, we cry: Vive l’Empereur!” Much as Joseph 
Guérin would indicate five years later, it was through a mutual devotion to the emperor that the 
unity of the Algerian people was made manifest. This ardor carried over into the official 
ceremonies staged during the imperial family’s visit. As the emperor laid the corner stone of the 
newly-planned Boulevard de l’Impératrice in the city, the “enraptured” crowd once again 
assumed center stage. “It is easy to see that a violent emotion agitates [the crowd] and that it 
makes every effort to contain it,” one account reported.38 Testaments of impassioned onlookers 
with tears of joy streaming down their cheeks and zealous cries of affection conformed to the 
Bonapartist script of national sovereignty and dynastic patriotism. “It was like an electrical 
12 
 
commotion,” claimed one writer when describing the emperor’s appearance in Boufarik. “Every 
soul vibrated in unison and joy overflowed in every heart—a bursting, communicative joy 
bordering on delirium.”39 
Yet if these visits to the colony bore the familiar marks of Bonapartist spectacle, the 
Algerian crowds possessed a noticeable difference. Whereas “the crowd” was often depicted as a 
homogenous body in France, observers were quick to note the diversity found among the crowds 
that turned out in Algeria. The mix of French, European and native spectators all scrambling to 
catch a glimpse of the sovereign imparted “a character as moving as it is pittoresque,” according 
to one commentator.40 As a colonial society, Algeria comprised a mosaic of French, Spanish, 
Maltese, Geek and Italian settlers, not to mention the Turkic peoples remaining from years of 
Ottoman rule and the sizeable Arab and Berber populations indigenous to the region. Visitors 
and officials commonly remarked on the variegated nature of the colonial population, finding “a 
strange, quaint and dazzling multiplicity,” a “veritable Babel” of dress and languages or “a 
human kaleidoscope.”41 Allusions to North African diversity were not, however, merely 
descriptive. Rather, they reiterated popular perceptions of Oriental heterogeneity implying that 
Algerian inhabitants lacked a national consciousness capable of constituting a proper nation.42 In 
“civilizing” Algeria, France was committed to a project of Oriental “regeneration,” a mission 
interpreted in terms of bequeathing a national identity and unity to a hopelessly divided society. 
“All the people of diverse origins, mores, customs, languages, races and religions [will] form 
only a single people: the Algerian people,” extolled the colonial publicist Jules Duval in 1852. 
Such would be “the capital work of France in the nineteenth century.”43  
Bonapartist discourse added a specific twist to aspirations for Algerian unity. Beside the 
fusion promised by a common French language and nationality rested the relationship between 
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subject and sovereign central to Bonapartist ideology. The two were not mutually exclusive and 
could support one another. In 1865, the mayor of Algiers stated as much, noting in his address to 
the emperor that while Algeria was diverse it nevertheless possessed a unity in and through the 
sovereign. “You find here a population which although of different races and origins comes 
together under a single flag, that of France, and knows only a Sovereign that it acclaims at this 
moment.”44 Other demonstrations of this unity could, however, prioritize the sovereign over 
assumption of national or cultural unity. In 1860, when colonial subjects erected mock Arc de 
Triomphes in anticipation of Napoleon III’s visit, each ethnic group presented their own version 
of this Napoleonic monument, outfitting it with stylistic flourishes evincing unique Spanish, 
Jewish or Arabic influences.45 The fact that the Emperor met separately with Arab, Kabyle and 
Jewish delegations during the course of his visit only highlighted the complexities that 
Bonapartist discourse invited. In a multiethnic society like Algeria, the question of what, in fact, 
constituted this envisaged national unity was never clear cut. Under the circumstances, devotion 
to the sovereign and devotion to a French patrie might not be one and the same.        
 
III. 
If public displays of devotion and cries of Vive l’Empereur! constituted part of the Bonapartist 
script governing national sovereignty, they also demonstrated the elastic nature of dynastic 
patriotism and the ways in which it could simultaneously accommodate national and colonial 
projects. From the beginning of his reign, Louis Napoleon revealed a willingness to inscribe 
political spectacles with imperial flourishes. Meeting the Islamic scholar and Algerian resistance 
leader Abd-al Qādir at the Palais Saint-Cloud in January 1852, Louis Napoleon treated him with 
an air of dignity befitting his notoriety in the Muslim world and permitted the bête-noire of the 
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Armée d’Afrique to carry out the traditional Islamic salāt. “Today, for the first time ever,” the 
official broadsheet Le Moniteur declared, “the Palais de Saint-Cloud heard the prayer of a 
Muslim.”46 That spring, a national military festivity staged at the École Militaire featured a half-
dozen Arab notables whom Louis Napoleon awarded with the Croix de la Légion d’honneur.47 
North Africa was never wholly absent in Bonapartist political pageantry and typically found a 
place alongside public celebrations of national sovereignty. These publicized events may have 
been aimed at nurturing a colonial consciousness and identity for the nation, but they equally 
testified to a discourse of imperial sovereignty that ran through Bonapartist politics.  
As the ruler of a multiethnic and multi-confessional empire, Napoleon III employed 
spectacle to legitimize his rule and cultivate loyalties among metropolitan citizens and colonial 
subjects alike. In Algeria, these forms of spectacle assumed a varied character. By the 1860s, 
imperial officials showed themselves disposed to consider Maghribi Arabs as a distinct national 
group, opening the possibility of recognizing certain national and cultural dispensations for 
Algeria’s native community. In seeking a solution to the troubling “Algerian question,” military 
officials in the Arab Offices criticized policies of overt national assimilation and Gallicization, 
arguing they only served to divide colonial society. Equitable treatment and native social 
integration rather than European colonization and dominance offered a more conciliatory 
approach, in their view. The question of whether Algeria was even a French colony at all was 
broached, with Napoleon III referring to it as an “Arab Kingdom” linked to France rather than a 
colony.48 While controversial, the Arab Kingdom policy marked a quintessentially Bonapartist 
approach to the Algerian question. It not only accorded with the Second Empire’s veneration for 
the principle of nationalité; it was also consistent with prevailing ideas of Napoleonic leadership. 
Bonapartist ideology was dependent upon incarnating the special relationship linking sovereign 
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and people, and this premise offered a model capable of organizing a diverse imperial 
community spanning the Mediterranean. An ostensibly “Arab” constituency constituted one 
community among a constellation of others, all associated through the imperial sovereign 
representing the national will.   
European colonists were naturally averse to talk of Arab nationality and integration, 
interpreting such policies as an affront to their aspirations for a French Algeria. Moreover, many 
settlers retained strong republican convictions that did not necessarily mesh with Bonapartist 
notions of authority.49 Colonists had only marginally supported the coup d’état and the 
establishment of the Bonapartist regime in 1851. The majority of support had come from the 
countryside, which “advantageously counterbalanced the negative votes of the cities,” as 
Auguste Bourget, editor of the Algerian daily Akhbar, remarked.50 Notoriously famous for his 
ideological flexibility and ability to sense which way the political winds blew in France, Bourget 
became one of the foremost publicists of the Napoleonic regime in the colony in the early 1850s, 
adroitly crafting his position to the new political culture and taking up the Bonapartist script. He 
urged Algerian electors to ratify the new regime and rally to the “unanimous voice of the patrie” 
in supporting Louis Napoleon Bonaparte.51 Following the Bonapartist victory of 1852 his paper 
carried detailed reports of the public celebrations organized in Algiers, describing scenes in 
which enthusiastic colonists displayed portraits of Napoleon I in illuminated windows.52 F. C. 
Beaumont, a regular contributor to Akhbar in the early 1850s, went further in his adulation. 
“Saved and regenerated, France puts all its hope for the future in [the new Napoleonic Empire],” 
he claimed.53 In Beaumont’s opinion, he believed that the rise of a new Napoleon signified “the 
time of monumental things has come for Algeria.”54  
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 Prescriptions to look to the emperor himself as a source of beneficence and largess 
became a staple of both national and colonial discourse. A book published on the occasion of the 
emperor’s visit to Marseille in 1860 deliberately played upon the theme of sovereign-as-patron, 
blandishing the emperor and claiming that “the genius of Napoleon III” was the primary force 
“protecting the destinies of Marseille and Algeria.” Such flattery was interspersed with 
reminders of the port city’s vital trade connection to North Africa and the need for sound 
economic policies and commercial investments, presumably by the state. “By the energetic effect 
of his strong will, Napoleon III will assure to Marseille and Algeria all that they must justly hope 
for their magnificent future,” the author prophesized.55 For Algerian colonists, the patronage of 
the sovereign was paramount. Possessing no political rights at the national level, and hence no 
actual power to influence policies applicable to the colony, they could only depend upon the 
good graces of the sovereign to enact legislation favorable to their interests. Although the lack of 
rights at the national level was a perennial grievance among colonists, settlers sought to 
circumvent this impediment by petitioning. Colonial petitions sought to make known the 
interests and desires of colonists through extra-parliamentary means, and the practice gained 
greater currency as the emperor’s Arab Kingdom policy drove a wedge between the government 
and settler population during the 1860s.56   
 If petitioning offered a means of giving voice to the silent colonial population, the 
imperial visits provided an opportunity to articulate these concerns directly to the sovereign. 
“People are hoping without doubt that the presence of the Emperor will assure to Algeria a 
general period of improvement and a remedy to the particular suffering experienced across 
various urban localities,” asserted one book written in anticipation of the sovereign’s arrival.57 
17 
 
Official descriptions of the visit in 1865 framed the event in just these terms, explaining that the 
emperor’s tour amounted to a personal inquest of the needs and potential of the colony. “I come 
among you to know your interests for myself,” Napoleon III stated when speaking to algerois 
colonists upon his arrival.58 In the following days he met with various local officials, toured 
colonial settlements and spoke with agriculturalists and merchants. During the official 
inspection, Napoleon III assumed the image of the paternal emperor, a reminder of the bond of 
both sovereign and patrie binding a multinational settler community to France. The royal 
connotations implicit within this relationship were not absent either. As the president of the 
colony’s Société Imperiale d’Agriculture noted to Napoleon III upon their meeting: “In previous 
centuries, whenever people felt a wrong had been committed, they would cry out: if the King 
only knew! For us Algerian colonists, conscious of a certain feebleness attributed to us at times, 
we never cease to say to ourselves: Ah! If only the Emperor could see!”59 
 Those outside official circles were no less eager to make their opinion known to the 
sovereign. A flurry of pamphlets and newspaper articles aimed to present colonist wishes in a 
clear and consistent voice, stating desires for representative government and the political rights 
that belonged to all French citizens. Joseph Guérin, a journalist dedicated to the cause of colonial 
enfranchisement, consciously framed these demands in the dominant idiom of Bonapartist 
political culture. He urged the importance of demonstrating the work and achievements of the 
colonial population to the emperor during his visit in order to familiarize him with the robust 
initiatives taking place in Algeria.60 Yet he also employed the Bonapartist discourse of patriotism 
and national unity to make a case for colonial civil and political rights. Colonists should be free 
to engage in municipal and local politics, which were neither based on factional ties nor party 
politics that might divide society. “Here we are all united because a single sentiment [animates 
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us] . . . the desire to make a strong Algeria within France and to recognize in this manner what 
France will do for us.” In Guérin’s appraisal, elected municipal bodies and local liberties were 
essential to the Bonapartist idea of sovereignty. Through elected bodies, the emperor would 
come to know the needs and desires of the colonial population, reinforcing that sacred 
relationship between sovereign and people. “Our Sovereign, who has wanted to be placed in 
direct communication with the population, can only persist in a way that gives truth free access 
to Him,” Guérin contended.61 In essence, what colonists were calling for was the creation of a 
trans-Mediterranean electorate, one afforded access to Algerian policymaking and, by proxy, 
incorporated into the bond uniting emperor and people.  
 While colonists appealed to the democratic elements implicit in Bonapartism and 
emphasized their desire to communicate directly with their sovereign, the problem remained that 
the European colonists were only one constituent part of Algerian society as the emperor was 
coming to imagine it. The Arab Kingdom policy officially announced in 1863 altered Algerian 
politics in significant ways as the state came to endorse not only native integration but native 
cultural and national development. After 1863, officials maligned by critics as “Arabophiles” 
pushed through policies aimed at bolstering cooperation with Muslim religious notables and 
“regenerating” a decadent Arab nationality. This supposed “Arab” nationality was a creation of 
the Algerian military administration and Arab Offices, and encompassed a heterogeneous North 
African population including Turks and Berbers who neither spoke Arabic nor identified with an 
Arab ethnicity.62 Nonetheless, the policy recognized a distinct national group with its own 
customs, history and culture that existed alongside the European settler population. “The natives, 
like the colonists, have an equal right to my protection,” declared Napoleon III. “I am the 
Emperor of the Arabs just as I am the Emperor of the French.”63  
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 This vision was driven home during the official state visits to Algeria as public spectacles 
and ceremonies attempted to cultivate the image of Napoleon III as an “Arab” emperor. The 
daily performances put on for the imperial entourage testified to the diverse nature of Algerian 
society and incorporated aspects of traditional Maghribine custom. Arab horsemanship was on 
full display in the fantasia, just as was gazelle hunting and dancing performances by dervishes. 
In the evenings, Napoleon III met with tribal leaders and sheiks, accepting gifts and bestowing 
on them Napoleonic medals and awards. While perceptions of “authentic” Arab culture remained 
highly stylized and consistent with the nineteenth-century culture of Orientalism, these 
performances and rituals were more than expressions of colonial exoticism. They amounted to an 
exercise in self-fashioning as Napoleon III crafted an image of himself as a nominally Arab ruler. 
This image testified to an imperial rather than strictly “colonial” culture in which the public 
figure of the sovereign was capable of representing and embodying multiple forms of attachment 
befitting a multiethnic empire.64 Moreover, as journalists and commentators noted, the image of 
“le sultan Napoléon” was a convincing one that assumed substance through the public presence 
and visibility of the emperor.65 “Before the arrival of the Emperor the Arabs showed themselves 
very avid to see His Imperial Majesty, but they continued to call him le sultan kebir des Roumis 
[Sultan of the Romans]” one newspaper stated in 1860. “Today, they all call him ‘our 
Emperor’.”66 
 The fête arabe staged during both imperial visits equally incorporated religious spectacle, 
presenting Napoleon III not only as an Arab ruler but a guardian and benefactor of dar al-Islam. 
Speeches given to primarily Muslim audiences were peppered with Quranic verse and assurances 
that Muslims would be permitted to practice their religion under French aegis.67 “[These 
speeches] have provoked and led some to believe that the Emperor might well not be a Christian 
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as previously supposed,” one colonist amusingly noted in 1865. “He is familiar with the Qur’an 
and not afraid to cite it.”68 In these addresses, Napoleon III affirmed his commitment to 
protecting Islam and made explicit allusion to Muhammad as a source of authority, underscoring 
his legitimacy as a Muslim ruler. “Your Prophet said: God gives the power to he who he wants. 
But in taking this power from him I seek to exercise it in your interest and for your wellbeing,” 
he stated. “You have understood that being your Sovereign, I am your protector.”69 These 
declarations were printed up, affixed to the walls of mosques and publicized among the native 
populations. In tandem with these addresses, colonial officials employed religious pageantry and 
discourse to full effect in an effort to reify the image of le sultan Napoléon. In a highly-
choreographed performance, Napoleon III met with the head mufti at the Jamma al-Jdid mosque 
in 1865, reiterating his assurance of France’s good faith vis-à-vis its Muslim subjects. Prayers 
were recited by religious officials as “the priests of Muhammad” bestowed their blessing on the 
emperor. For a Bonapartist proponent like Saint-Félix, the congruities with Napoleon I’s abortive 
Egyptian campaign of 1798 only highlighted the sense of dynastic continuity that the regime 
coveted. “Dignified successor of his uncle, Napoleon III knew to speak to all his subjects 
according to their religion, habits and language.”70 
 Speeches and festivities staged for the sake of the native population certainly 
demonstrated Napoleon III’s skill at “playing Muslim,” but these efforts at self-fashioning were 
never divorced from the general conception of sovereignty adhered to by Bonapartists. During 
the state visit le sultan Napoléon also bestowed awards on European colonists, met with the 
Algerian arch-bishop and attended mass in Algiers and Blida. If Napoleon III spoke the political 
language of Islam, he equally espoused the discourse of a Christian and national sovereign. In 
these various iterations of sovereignty, Napoleon III adroitly cultivated the image of a national 
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monarch capable of uniting all the peoples of a diverse French empire. In this context, 
Bonapartism elaborated and even prefigured many of the symbols and discourses that would 
characterize the “invented traditions” and pageantry of royal government later in the century. 
The pretense of a Napoleonic sultan anticipated the Ottomanism and Islamism of the Hamidian 
era just as Bonapartist national dynasticism hinted at the “dynastic patriotism” cultivated in the 
latter years of the Habsburg Empire.71 That the French polity would move in a decisively 
republican direction after 1870 should not obscure the continuities that exist with later 
developments across the continent as absolutist regimes underwent a phase of ideological 
retrenchment to accommodate the currents of modern nationalism.  
  The particular style of Bonapartist discourse lent itself to multiple representations of 
sovereignty that permitted Napoleon III to be, at once, a French and Arab emperor. These 
identities acquired their consistency through the public spectacles and pageantry staged during 
the two official visits to the colony. In festivities and official proclamations, the image promoted 
was that of a multiethnic French imperial community over a homogenous national one. Through 
its dynastic and patriotic elements, Bonapartism was capable of advancing a brand of imperial 
diversity that both spoke to republican ideas of national sovereignty while drawing upon older 
forms of corporatism and social exclusivity. Yet even as Bonapartist policies constructed an 
imagined French imperial community, they simultaneously engendered and reinforced many of 
divisions running through the heart of Algerian society. In appealing to colonial subjects, 
Bonapartism distinguished between a European constituency juxtaposed against a native 
community defined in the terms of its Arab nationality and Islamic identification. These 
grouping would characterize the frontlines of an ongoing struggle over Algerian sovereignty and, 
later, independence, throughout the century. Maintaining both an “Arab Kingdom” and a 
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“French Algeria” was only sustainable through an authoritative sovereign capable of 
representing and publicly engaging with a plurality of social groups and interests. Once this 
lynchpin was removed, the common imperial edifice would collapse.  
 
IV. 
Iterations of Bonapartist sovereignty in Algeria shed light on the various inconsistencies and 
ambiguities that have often been attributed to a movement which at once appeared authoritarian, 
popular and democratic in substance. Imperial politics encouraged public displays of loyalty and 
spectacle, giving Bonapartism a distinct culture that drew upon and synthesized a number of 
different political traditions and discourses. It relied strongly upon a sacralized vision of 
sovereignty, emphasizing the bond uniting people and emperor, nation and ruler. This discourse 
inspired emotive displays of devotion that could assume numerous forms of expression and adapt 
itself to national and imperial frameworks as needed. If the impassioned and unanimous crowd 
took center stage in national narratives, the colonial milieu brought forth a range of 
representations molded to fit the contours of an inherently diverse society. In Algeria, the various 
registers of Bonapartist political culture were on full display, fusing elements of religion, 
nationality and dynastic loyalty to varying degrees. Through public celebrations and imperial 
pageantry, the Second Empire used the forms of a revolutionary political culture to articulate a 
brand of imperial and dynastic sovereignty that deviated from republican principles in crucial 
ways. 
The post-revolutionary period was, in many ways, a laboratory in which contending 
ideologies merged and took on hybridized forms. While 1870 is commonly thought of as a 
“break” in French modern history, it is difficult to ignore that the founders of the Third Republic 
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were responsive to the Bonapartist culture that loomed over the formative years of their political 
and journalistic careers.72 By the tail end of the Second Empire, republicans showed a readiness 
to adopt certain elements of the Bonapartist script and translate them into republican terms. 
Speaking to a crowd of Algerian colonists in 1868, Jules Favre, an inveterate defender of settler 
interests in Paris, seemed to be taking a page from the Bonapartist playbook. Addressing the 
crowd as fellow “citizens,” he proceeded to emphasize the important link that existed between a 
political representative and his constituency, transposing Bonapartist ideas of sovereignty into a 
republican idiom. “Between us there is a bond that exists between all men who support a 
common idea and [this bond] is now strengthened at this very moment by our personal contact,” 
he told his audience.73 If mention of the bond uniting representative and people and the emphasis 
on personal contact was reminiscent of Bonapartist political discourse, there was, nonetheless, a 
significant difference. This sacralized politic only applied to an imagined body of European 
citizens. It did not extend to the various communities and “tribes” populating France’s vast 
empire. The Bonapartist synthesis relied upon a personal form of rule that situated a plurality of 
cultural and social groups in relation to the sovereign. Republican democracy confined this 
“sacred” bond to an atomized citizenry invested with universal rights.74 Republicans like Favre 
may have been disposed to borrow certain aspects of Bonapartist discourse, yet they were not 
inclined to compromise their principles. Supplanting the diversified imperial sovereignty of 
Bonapartist personal rule was the republican logic of colonial citizenship and differentiation, and 
with it the ideology that would underpin a republican vision of empire in the years ahead.   
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